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Having read several publications by David B. Wexler and Bruce
J. Winick, generously shared with me by the authors during the past
two years, I formed an opinion about the developing discussion of
whether appellate courts need therapeutic jurisprudence.' I also drew
upon the benefits of therapeutic jurisprudence that I saw first-hand in
a community mediation/dispute settlement program I helped establish
several years ago.2 At that time, it became clear that alternative meth-
ods were needed to solve community disputes and to provide legal
services to poor people because funds for the Legal Services Corpora-
tion were being drastically reduced. When I told my colleagues that I
was writing a brief law review article on therapeutic jurisprudence in
appellate courts, I was asked whether there was a need for it in courts
whose usual role is to review trial tribunal decisions. I was also asked
how therapeutic jurisprudence would work in an appellate court.
I. APPELLATE COURTS' NEED FOR THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE
The caseload at the North Carolina Court of Appeals continues
to grow dramatically. Last year, for example, the twelve judges of our
court filed full written opinions in 1,650 cases and decided 3,500
motions and petitions.3 How do we deal with an ever-growing case
load? Federal and state appellate courts have pursued various mea-
sures in addressing this demand. However, some of these measures
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have resulted in a "countervailing concern."4 In February 2000, the
American Bar Association (ABA) reported:
[these measures] have hampered the quality of review and deci-
sion making and have restricted public information regarding
the reasons for decisions. As a result, attorneys, their clients,
legal scholars and others may believe that cases have not
received full consideration and that the opinions, judgments and
orders are inadequate and even unjust.'
Furthermore, the ABA report quoted Professor Martha J.
Dragrich's observation that, "[t]he courts of appeals' admittedly legiti-
mate concerns with increasing caseloads do not warrant practices that
threaten the development of a coherent body of law and funda-
mentally alter our appellate traditions."6
Our court is actively responding to the challenge of an increasing
caseload, but it is clear that appellate courts need alternatives. One
member of our court has submitted a proposed plan to the National
Center for State Courts, outlining a comprehensive training program
that fosters both the personal and professional development of judges
and court staff. One judge is chair of our state's dispute resolution
program, and another judge is involved in pro se filing of legal actions,
broadening access to the courts in a manner aimed at increasing effi-
ciency and fairness.'
To improve the efficiency of our appellate courts, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has implemented electronic filing of appeals
and the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts has
submitted a grant application to the State Justice Institute to fund an
experimental electronic filing program at our court. Moreover, we are
creating outreach programs to make the public aware of problems
faced by the courts. For example, our judges are speaking to public
organizations and schools about our judicial system and holding court
sessions in courthouses and law schools across the state. Credibility
with the public is essential, and educating the public about the work-
ings of the judicial system and its role in our democracy is vital.
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II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE IN THE APPELLATE PROCESS
The next question is how therapeutic jurisprudence might oper-
ate in the appellate process. In our trial courts, our state has seen the
success of mandatory mediation for claims under $15,000, and the
North Carolina Industrial Commission's mediation program settles
more than ninety percent of its cases through mediation. Every
federal circuit court in the country has a mediation program. In fact,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has a settlement rate of almost
one-fourth of its cases.
It is no coincidence that a committee of our court recently
recommended we propose to our state supreme court that a mediation
program be established for our court. There are more than twenty-
five mediation programs operating in state appellate courts, evidencing
the need for another approach to resolving cases.
One might be skeptical that parties can still resolve differences
on their own by the time their case reaches the state or federal appeals
court. Yet, appellate level cases present an excellent opportunity for
mediation for several reasons. As Mori Irvine, the Chief Mediator of
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, writes:
The parties' professional motives often include a concern with
the probabilities of winning on appeal (does the client want to
take the risk of losing on appeal?), an interest in protecting a
favorable lower court opinion (does the client want to lose that
decision?), and the availability of alternative legal avenues that
are better suited to resolving the client's problem ... The par-
ties' practical, business, and personal interests may also push
them towards mediation. Ultimately, settlement brings peace of
mind to the participants.8
Furthermore, Irvine observes, "[e]ven on appeal, cases are not
static. Everything continues to evolve: The law changes, circum-
stances change, the decision makers change, new case law comes
down.'
Mediation changes the traditional role of appellate courts in
deciding whether a trial tribunal committed an error that deprived the
appellant of a fair hearing. The Honorable Shirley M. Hufstedler,
Circuit Judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, defined the
work of appellate courts as follows:
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[a]ppellate courts serve two quite different functions: First,
appellate courts review the trial record for error in the particular
case. We can call this the review for correctness. Second, appel-
late courts use the cases before them as vehicles for stating and
applying constitutional principles, for authoritatively interpret-
ing statutes, for formulating and expressing policy on legal
issues of system-wide concern, for developing the common law,
and for supervising each level of the system below them. We
can call the second set of tasks the institutional functions-the
business of Government."°
With therapeutic jurisprudence in the form of mediation, we will
no longer determine whether there was error in the trial; we will
actually help mold a resolution of the case acceptable to the parties.
Therapeutic jurisprudence means more than just employing
mediation at the appellate court level. It invites judges to think in
terms of the law as a healing force. Indeed, applying therapeutic juris-
prudence at the trial level seems very natural when crafting a practical
result with which all the parties can live.
Crafting a written opinion that will assist the parties in healing
their disagreements is a new idea that requires judges to have a height-
ened sensitivity to the language they choose. In their role as word-
smiths, judges can be decisive and still be positive. In addition to
referring to our thesaurus for a more precise word when writing an
opinion, we need to develop a list of creative methods of resolving the
parties' disagreements-therapeutic remedy options. The prospect is
a challenging and unique opportunity for those of us who also wish to
be problem solvers helping people.
III. CONCLUSIONS: THE POTENTIAL FOR THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE IN APPELLATE COURTS
Therapeutic jurisprudence has multiple possibilities, provided it
does not add another layer of cost, delay, and time to the process.
First, we should see "a reduced number of cases for the appellate court
to decide, fewer remands and secondary appeals, the streamlining of
appeals through partial resolution of issues, the satisfaction of parties'
underlying needs and interests, and the reduction of the time a case
spends on appeal."" Second, the outcome does not have to become
part of the case law that applies to similar cases, possibly establishing
10. Hon. Shirley M. Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial
System, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 901, 910 (1971).
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negative precedent. Third, mediation allows personal healing and the
development of positive, achievable values. Respect for the law and
the legal process can develop in a distrustful culture. 2
These changes should also benefit lawyers. As author Deborah
Tannen writes, lawyers will no longer have to be dedicated to "what
the adversarial culture does to those who practice within the system,
requiring them to put aside their consciences and natural inclination
toward human compassion."' 3 Therapeutic jurisprudence would sat-
isfy the heritage of the lawyer's duties. Lawyers are "not just means to
someone else's ends."' 4 Lawyers have a duty "to protect the rule of
law as an ideal, to serve the system of justice on which our democracy
is based, and to study and promote humanism.... ","
As Mme. Bertha Wilson, retired Justice of the Supreme Court of
Canada, stated, "[t]he goal ... is not seen in terms of winning or
losing, but, rather, in terms of achieving an optimum outcome for all
individuals involved .... "16 With therapeutic jurisprudence in the
appellate courts, perhaps our judicial system can achieve "that opti-
mum outcome."
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